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V. JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is based upon U.C.A. 
78-2a-3(2)(i) pursuant to which the Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity. 
VI. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review in this case is: 
Did the trial court deprive the Appellant, Thomas Vicent 
Dispenza of his constitutional right to a trial on the merits under 
the Constitution of the United States. Amendment Five. and 
Constitution of the United States. Amendment Fourteen and based 
upon the Constitution of Utah. Article I. Section 7 and Article I, 
Section 11 by denying him his right to due process of law. 
The Standard of Review is the same as though the Lower Court 
had granted a summary judgement disposing of the issues short of a 
trial and therefore the Standard of Review is that the appellant is 
entitled to have all of the facts presented and all the inferences 
arising there from considered in a light most favorable to them. 
Morris vs. Farnsworth Motel. 123 U 289. 259 P2nd 297 (19531. 
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VII. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Constitutional Provisions sought to be interpreted are the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and 
Article I. Section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides: 
That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
and Article I. Section 11 of the Utah Constitution which states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for and injury 
done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administer 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecution or defending before any tribunal in 
this state, by himself of counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute over child custody between two 
unwed parents. 
The Appellee, Tammy Degrauwe filed an action in the court 
seeking custody of the Appellee's and Appellant's minor son. The 
Appellant counterclaimed and sought the custody of his son. 
Temporary custody was granted to the Appellee pending a trial on 
the merits. (Record transcript pages 1 though 3 and pages 17 though 
20) 
A Trial was scheduled before Judge John Rokich on August 4, 
1992. One of the reason the Appellant father was contesting 
custody was because he claimed he had been consistently denied 
visitation with his son. He was therefore willing to enter into a 
trial period to see if he could obtain vistation in view of the 
admonishment given by the court. At that time a a temporary trial 
period stipulation was reach with the provision that it would be a 
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ninety (90) day int period with a review to be heard by the 
court to see if the 01*. was complied with by both parties and if 
it should be adopted as f permanent order. The court was called 
into session and the int :min stipulation was read into the court 
and agreed to by both parties. A portion of the stipulation read 
into t. cour reco was that this stipulation would prevail and 
abide til 90 day from this date, at which time or there about 
there uld be a review hearing. Some the conditions of the 
stipulation were are follows: 
(1) Ina mother would have temporary custody of the child. 
(2) he prior problems with the child visitation by the 
father would be solved by a strict scheduled being set by the court 
and with a stern admonishment by the court to the mother that the 
visitation schedule must be followed. 
(3) The matter would be reviewed after ninety (90) days as to 
the compliance of both parties. 
(Transcript of the proceedings held on Tuesday August 4, 1992 page 
1, lines 16 though 25, pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7) 
An order was prepared by the Appellant's counsel and sent to 
the Appellee's counsel for approval. The order was sent back by 
the Appellee's counsel for redraft and that was done and 
resubmitted to the Appellee counsel. After a considerable time, in 
which the Appellee's counsel neither approved nor objected to the 
order, had expired the Appellant's counsel submitted it to the 
court for signing. Judge Rokich executed the order on October 15, 
1992. (Record transcript pages 190 and 191) 
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A ninety day review had been scheduled on November 20,1992 but 
was continued to November 30, 1992. 
On November 5, 1992, a Motion to Set Aside the October 15, 
1992 order was made by the Appellee's Counsel, 
(record transcript 192 to 210) 
At the November 30, 1992 review hearing the court set aside 
the October 15th order and made awarded the custody of the child to 
the Appellee. The Appellant father, who felt that the appellee had 
violated the agreement wanted to proceed to trial on the merits but 
was prevented from doing so because the court made an ad hoc ruling 
granting awarding custody to the mother and there by deprived the 
father of his due process rights of a trial on the merits. 
According to the Appellant the trial period arrangements was 
entirely unsatisfactory and he desired to proceed to court on the 
child custody issue. It was a complete surprise to both the 
Appellant and his counsel when the Judge set aside the order and 
awarded permanent custody to the Appellee and thus depriving the 
father of a trial on the merits. 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Appellant, Thomas Vincent Dispenza was deprived of 
his constitutional due process rights to hearing on the merits on 
the issues of custody and child support payments and was deprived 
of that hearing on the merits by the ruling of the court. 
2. The court entered an order providing for a trial period 
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only of temporary custody in the mother at the end of which time 
the Appellant, Thomas Vincent Dispenza was entitled to proceed to 
litigate the issues on the merits if he was dissatisfied on the 
arrangements. 
(1) Mr. Dispenza in good faith endured the trial period of 
custody in the mother but was consistently denied visitation and 
elected to prosecute the case to a trial on the merits. 
(2) The court then erroneously determined that Mr. Dispenza 
had entered a finial stipulation and waived his rights to a trial 
on the merits. 
(3) The Appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza did not wave his 
rights to a trial on the merits. 
(4) The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a 
trial on the merits under the Constitution of the United States. 
(5) The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a 
trial on the merits under the Utah Constitution. 
(6) The Appellant is entitled to a trial on the merits in a 
domestic relation case. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. 
The appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza was deprived of his 
constitutional due process rights to a hearing on the merits 
on the issues of custody and child support payments and 
was deprived of that hearing on the merits by the ruling of 
the court. 
This is the event of facts which led the Appellant to enter 
into a stipulation which was to conclude in only ninety (90) days. 
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This was not a permanent stipulation unless the terms were 
satisfoactory for both parties of this litigation which it did not. 
As to the facts that this was only a ninety (90) stipulation one 
must read from the proceedings of the August 4, 1992 hearing and is 
quoted below from page 1 lines 1 though 19: 
Mr. Summerhays: This stipulation will prevail and abide 
until 90 days from this date, at which time, or there about, 
we will be given a date by the clerk for a an automatic review 
by the court. 
The order that was signed by the Judge Rokich on October 15, 1992 
states language as to the temporary state of the order found on 
page 190 of the record transcript as follows: 
The Plaintiff shall have temporary custody of the 
parties7s minor son during the pendency of this ninety day 
interim order subject to the defendant having reasonable 
visitation more particularly set forth in the standard 
schedule of visitation presently recognized by this court and 
in addition to this said schedule of visitation, the defendant 
shall have visitation with the minor son every Wednesday from 
5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
On November 30, 1992 Judge Rokich set aside the October 15, 
1992 order and made a new order without hearing the facts or issues 
involved in this case. The constitutes a violation of due process 
which is a right under both the Constitution of the United States 
and the Utah Constitution. 
B. 
The court entered an order providing for a trial period only 
of temporary custody in the mother at the end of which time 
the Appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza was entitled to proceed 
to litigate the issues on the merits. 
As has been previously discussed the stipulation was only 
prevail and abide for ninety (90) days at which time the court 
would review and determine if the parties abided by the order and 
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if it was a workable order. If the order was not working then by 
the rights of due process the case should have been scheduled for 
trial again and each side should have the opportunity to present it 
case. This was never done and the Appellant was denied his 
constitution rights. 
C. 
Mr. Dispenza in good faith endured the trial period of custody 
in the mother but was consistently denied visitation and 
elected to prosecute the case to a trial on the merits. 
During the ninety (90) day interim period there were many 
problems that arose from the Appellee's a live in boy friend. 
There were also arguments with the Appellant and Appellee over 
transportation. These disputes were brought to the attention of 
the Judge at the proceedings held on November 30, 1992. 
Quoting from the transcript of the proceeding page 2 line 25 and 
page 3 lines 1 though 9 as follows: 
Court— Now, its's my understanding that there has been some 
problem with regards to visitation; is that correct? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: and the court is going to make an order that if 
either party comes back before the court and the court finds 
that there is a violation of the visitation schedule, that 
party who has violated the order will be forthwith admitted to 
the Salt Lake County Jail for two days. 
(proceeding transcript of November 30, 1992 page 3 lines 23 though 
25 and page 4 line 1) 
The court: The one concern, I thought there was an individual 
living at the house that precludes him from going to the house 
because they always have words. 
The court also had concerns about the visitation problems and made 
the stern admonishment to both parties at the second hearing. Mr. 
Dispenza had endured all of the problems with visitation including 
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denial by the appellee, verbal abuse by the live in boy friend and 
transportation problems. It was clear that the arrangement had not 
worked out and when Mr. Dispenza appeared at the second hearing he 
had decided that it would be best to continue with the trial and 
seek custody of the child on the merits and facts of the case but 
was denied this right to due process by the judge's new order. 
D. 
The court erroneously determined that Mr. Dispenza had 
entered a finial stipulation and waived his rights to a trial 
on the merits. 
It is clear from the transcript of August 4, 1992 that Mr. 
Dispenza was only stipulation and agreeing to abide to the 
provisions for ninety (90) days as a test period to seek if the 
stipulation was feasible. As is shown by the proceeding transcript 
on page 1 lines 16 though 19 as is quoted below: 
Mr. Summerhays: This stipulation will prevail and abide until 
90 days from this date, at which time, or there about, we 
will be given a date by the clerk for an automatic review by 
the court, 
It is clear that Mr. Dispenza did not wave his rights to a trial 
but merely entered into a ninety (90) day interim period. The 
court assumed away the rights of the Appellant to his day in court 
to present the facts in the case. 
E. 
The Appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza did not wave his rights 
to a trial on the on the merits. 
As has been discussed previously this was only a ninety (90) 
day interim period to see if the stipulation was feasible. Mr. 
Dispenza did not wave his rights to due process but was rather 
8 
denied these rights by the court. Due process is a right given to 
all citizens of the United States by Amendments to the Constitution 
but also given to every resident of the State of Utah through the 
Utah Constitution. 
In the case of Celebrity Club Incorporated vs. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 657 P2nd 1293,1296 the court explained the due 
process of guaranteed as follows: 
Neither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person 
constitutional rights or deprive such person of a vested 
interest in property with any opportunity to be heard. To do so 
constitutes taking of property without due process of law. 
Many attempt have been made to further define "due process" 
but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his 
day in court- that is each party shall have the right to a 
hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being 
heard and introduction evidence to establish his cause or 
defense, after which comes judgement upon which thus made. 
also see Hailing vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 71 Utah 112, 
125, 263 P 78, 82 (1927); Christensen vs. Harris 109 Utah 1, 6, 7, 
163 P2nd 314, 315 (1945) and Regans vs. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 89 Utah 183,217: 51 P2nd 645, 660 (1935). 
F. 
The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a trial on 
the merits under the Utah Constitution Articles I, Sections 7 
& 11. 
Under the Utah Constitution Article I, Sections 7 & 11 Mr, 
Dispenza was guaranteed the right to due process but he has been 
denied this right. The Utah Constitution provides in Article I, 
Section 7 as follows: 
No person shall be deprived life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
The Utah Constitution provides in Article I, Section 11 as 
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follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury to 
him and his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
state, by himself or counsel in any civil cause in which he is 
a party. 
These rights of due process as described above were denied to the 
Appellant by order of the court which out a trial on the merits. 
G. 
The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a trial on 
the merits under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
An opportunity for a hearing before competent and impartial 
tribunal upon proper notice is one of the essential elements of due 
process under Amendments Five and Fourteen of the Constitution of 
the United States as is evidences in the following cases; Armstrong 
vs. Manzo, 380 US 545. 14 L Ed 2nd 62, 66; Schroeder vs. New York, 
371 US 208, 9 L Ed 2nd 255; Shield vs. Utah I.C.R. Co. , 105 US 177, 
83 L Ed 111; Powell vs. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158; Blackmer 
vs. United States, 284 US 421, 76 L Ed 375; Farmers Union Property 
& Casualty Co. vs. Thompson 4 Utah 2nd 7, 286 P2nd 249; Employees 
of Utah Fuel Co. vs. Industrial Com of Utah, 99 Utah 88, 104 P2nd 
197; Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. vs. Public Service Com., 99 Utah 28, 
96 P2nd 722. 
The right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 
grievous loss of any kind is a principle basic to our society as is 
demonstrated in Wisconsin vs. Constantineau, 400 US 433, 27 L Ed 2d 
515. When interests involving liberty and property rights 
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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated, the right to 
some kind of prior hearing is paramount. This point is 
demonstrated in Board of Regents vs. Roth. 408 US 564, 33 L Ed 2nd 
548. In this case the Appellant has been deprived of his rights and 
the minor child has also been deprived of his constitutional rights 
to a fair and impartial hearing as to which arrent he will reside. 
The Appellant is a real party of interest to assert those rights. 
All of the cases cited under the previous section as to why 
the Appellant's rights were violated under the Utah Constitution 
are apropoe and formulate an addition basis as to why the Appellant 
was deprived of his rights under the Federal Constitution. 
H. 
The Appellant is entitled to a trial on the merits in a 
domestic relation case. 
In the Celebrity Club Inc.. supra the defendant argued that the 
Plaintiff's interest in his liquor lease did not constitute 
"property" within the meaning of the Utah Constitution provisions. 
The court stated at pages 1296 and 1297 as follows: 
Although it is true that the United States Supreme Court once 
recognized a distinction between "rights" and "privileges" in 
determining whether to afford due process protection to 
asserted property rights, that Court has now "sully and 
finally rejected the wooden distinction between *right7 and 
privileges7" Board of Regents vs. Roth, 408 US 564. 571. 92 
S. Ct 2710. 33 L Ed 2nd 548 (1972). In recent cases, the 
Court has expressed in preference for a more flexible 
definition of "property" in this contest: 
lf{P}roperty" interests subject to procedural due 
process protection are not limited by a few rigid, 
technical forms. Rather, "property" denotes a broad 
range of interests that are secured by "existing rules or 
understand." 
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of 
property to protect those claims upon which people rely 
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be 
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arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the 
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an 
opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims. 
Under a child custody case as is the focus of this case the 
defendant in a sense is denied something that belongs to him with 
the process of law of a trial on the merits to determine which 
parent would be better suited for the child to reside with. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The Appellant and his son were denied of their constitutional 
rights to a hearing on the merits. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and under 
Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution it is clear 
that they did not receive due process as is guaranteed under the 
constitutions. This case should be remanded back to the lower 
court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this \i±^ day of v„it 1993. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Summerhays^ v 
Attorney for Appellant 
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